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Article 9

NOTES
AVIATION-TRESPASS TO REALTY.-The rapid growth of aviation
has been followed with interest by people throughout the world. The
attendant physical problems are matters of common knowledge. But
not so generally known is the fact that aviation has been constantly
confronted with a legal obstacle. The obstacle has been lilaced in
the form of a question, doubting the right of an aviator to a free
passage through the air above another's land.
For hundreds of years the question of the right to invade such air
space involved merely the lower stratum of the air. The difficulties
that arose very seldom concerned the rights of individuals above one
hundred feet from the ground. As a consequence the early English
cases quite generally held that any intrusion into the space above
another's land was actionable.' In America the courts have followed
the English decisions closely in upholding the rights of the land owner.The basis of the decisions upon invasions of the air space is the
maxim Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum.3 Strictly construed
this maxim would state that any passage over another's land, at
whatever height. is a trespass. The strict interpretation was followed
by "many authors in past years. The modern adherents put it to use
4
in proclaiming all aviators trespassers.

1 Baten's Case, 9 Coke's Reports 54 (1611); Penruddock's Case, 3 Coke'.
Reports 205 (1597); Fay v. Prentice, 1 C. B. 827 (1845) (projection over another's land as a nuisance); Clifton v. Bury, 4 T. L. R. 8 (1887); Kenyon v.
Hart, 6 B. & S. 249, 118 S. C. L. 249, 122 Reprint 1188 (1865) (firing of guns
over land as a trespass). The latter case criticizes the dictum in Pickering v.
Rudd. 4 Camp. 219 (1815), wherein Lord Ellenborough expressed the belief that
it was no trespass to fire a gun over the land of another. See also, Ellis v. Loftus
Iron Co., L. R. 10, C. P. 10 (1874); Wandsworth Board of Works v. United
Tel. Co. (1884) 13 Q. B. D. 904, 12 Eng. Rul. Cas. 630.
2 Hannabalson v. Sessions, 116 Iowa 457, 90 N. W. 93 (1902) (thrusting
arm into space above another's land); Hoffman v. Armstrong, 48 N. Y. 201, 8
Am. Rep. 537 (1872)
(overhanging branches); Whittaker v. Stangwick, 100
Minn. 386, 111 N. W. 295 (1907) (shooting over another's land); Butler v.
Frontier Tel. Co., 186 N. Y. 486, 79 N. E. 716, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 920 (1906)
(wires stretched over another's land). See also: Markham v. Brown, 37 Ga. 277,
92 Am. Dec. 73 (1867); Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 Pac. 328, 42 A. L. R. 937
(1925); Harrington v. McCarthy, 169 Mass. 492, 48 N. E. 278 (1897); Grandona
v. Lovedal, 70 Cal. 161, 11 Pac. 623 (1886); Puroto v. Chieppa, 78 Conn. 401,
62 At!. 664 (1905) ; Murphy v. Bolger, 60 Vt. 723, 15 Atl. 365 (1888) ; Codman
v. Evans, 9 Mass. 431 (1863).
a ,,.... the word 'land' includes not only the face of the earth, but everything under it or over it." 2 Blackstone Comm. (4th. ed.) 18; CoxE on Lir. 4a.
4 "The improbability of actual damage is irrelevant to the pure legal theory,
neither is it necessary that there should be force nor unlawful intention; there
seems every reason to support the proposition that the mere flight over a person's
land is an act of trespass and that an action would lie against the offending
avintnr_" 46 CAN T.- T_ 730
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Others strongly contend that the maxim must be taken with certain
limitations. 5 They point out that, at the time of its origin, the maxim
was applied to a very limited area. The maxim is attributed to Accursius,0 a glossator or commentator on the Code, who lived in Bologna
about the year 1200. The phrase was used by Accursius in a discussion
of rig~hts under the Code to have burial plots or tombs free from the
interference of an overhanging building. 7
It may well be said that, in view of the circumstances under which
he used the word, Accursius 'had no intention of applying this rule
to a height beyond Aiat which might reasonably be used by landowners. "According to good Latin usage, the coelum was a spacewhich began only a short distance above the surface of the earth." 8
As the landowner owns up to but not inclusive of the coelum, his
rights would appear to have been limited to a space only a little
above the height of the tallest buildings.
Despite the controversy upon the question, the exact question of
the right of an aviator to fly over another's land haq never been determined. The opinions expressed in early English and'American decisions
were made when no such question had to be decided. Now, with
aviation gaining, almost overnight, a position of importance in the
commercial field, the feeling is prevalent that a doctrine must be
adopted which will recognize a right of passage in the air. and place
our newest industry upon a law-abiding basis. 9
The theory has been advanced that there can be no trespass by
passage through the air until some actual harm results.' 0
A second theory asserts that above a reasonable height, "that of
possible effective possession," it is no trespass to fly over another's
land. This theory is more liberal in that it does not place as strict
a liability upon the aviator in case of actual damage or inconvenience.
5 ....
within reasonable limitations land includes not only the surface
but also the space above and the .part beneath." Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co.
(cited supra note 2).
6 Although it is ascribeol by Brissaud and Miraglia to Cinus (or Gino) of
Pistoia, a student of Accursius. 23 ILL LAW Ray. 49.
7 Sweetland v. Curtis Airports Corporation, 41 Fed. (2d.)
ArR LAW REvIEw 394.

934 (1930); 1

8 62 Am. LAW REv. 894.
9 "Perhaps we may go further and say that he (subjacent proprietor) has
no right at all over the air above his land, except so far as its occupation by
others could be of injury to his estate. This seems to be a view quite in
accordance with the spirit of our time. Modern government tends, at all points,
to push the public good farther and farther into what was formerly thought
the inviolable domain of private right." 4 Am. J. INT. L. 95.
10 "It is submitted, however, that there can be no trespass without some
physical contact with the land (including, of course, buildings, trees, and other
things attached to the soil) and that a mere entry into the air space above the
land is not an actionable wrong unless it causes some harm, danger or inconvenience to the occupier of the surface. When any such harm, danger or inconivenience does exist, there is a cause of action in the nature of a nuisance." SALmoNo, LAW oF Toars (7th ed.) 238.
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A third theory maintains that individual landowners are not the
absolute owners of the super-jacent air space. The property rests in
the state, which has the duty- to regulate the use of such air space.
"Rights do not belong to the individual as they might be in the state
of nature, or as they might be if each acted irrespectively of the others.
They belong to them as members of the society in which each recognizes the other as an originator of action in the same sense in which
he is conscious of being so himself, and thus regards the free exercise
of his own powers as dependent upon his allowing an equally free
exercise of his.powers to every other member of the society * * * the
members of the state derive their rights from the state * * * every
right is derived from some social relation."'"
With no binding decisions upon the subject, the law making bodies
of the various nations have felt themselves free to control the air rights
on principles other than that of eminent domain.
The International Air Convention of 1919, which was attended by
a majority of the major nations of the world, recognized the principle
of complete and exclusive state sovereignty in the air space superincumbent upon its domain., Following the rules laid down by this convention, England by the Air Navigation Act of 1920 provided "that
no action shall lie in respect of trespass or in respect of nuisance, by
reason only of the flight of aircraft over any property at a height
above the ground which, having regard to the wind, weather and all
the circumstances of the case, is reasonable, or the ordinary incidents
of such flight." 12
"Article 19 of the French law of May 31, 1924, provides that aircraft may pass freely above French territory;" but that :'the right
of aircraft to fly over privately owned land cannot be exercised under
conditions such as to interfere with the rights of the owner." 13
The German Civil Code and the Swiss Code, while recognizing the
extension of property rights into the air, declared that the subjacent
owner cannot prohibit interferences which 14take place at such a height
that he has no interest in the prevention.
In the United States, the unsettled state of the authorities causes
some doubt as to the right of a state or nation arbitrarily to make
laws regulating air rights. Various suggestions were made as to the
right of Congress to control this matter under -the admiralty clause
and other clauses of the Constitution. Congress did exercise its power,
but under the commerce clause of the Constitution. 15 By the Air
Commerce Act of 1926, Congress gave the Secretary of Commerce
the power to make laws governing the minimum altitude of flight and
11 FixEL, LAW OF AVIATION at 32, quoting from GREEN'S PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS" 143, 145, 146.
12 SALMOND, op. cit. supra note 10.
13 1 AIR LAW REV. 399.
14 2 C. J. 304 (note 38, b and c).

1. AmT. I, SEC. 8, par. 3.
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declares that the navigable air space is to be subject to a public right
of freedom of air navigation.1 6 The Federal rule, of course, 'applies
only to interstate and foreign aviation.
Such rules as Congress authorized have been promulgated by the
Secretary of Commerce, 17 and have been held to be constitutional.' 8
The Federal laws have been generally used as the- basis of the State
laws and the Federal right has been held supreme even where the
interstate movements were only remotely affected. 19 But the State's
right is equally recognized and where Federal laws do not apply, as in
intrastate commerce, regulatory statutes have been passed, the most
prominent being the Uniform State Law of Aeronautics.
Frank J. Downs.

BILLS AND NOTES-PAYMENT ON FORGED CHECKS.-In a

recent

Iowa case 1 the doctrine of Price v. Neal 2 was again invoked and

criticized. The rule established by Price v. Neal, that a drawee pays
(or accepts) at his peril a bill, on which the drawer's signature is
forged, has been repeatedly recognized both in England and in the
United States. 3 There are few courts of dernier resort which reject
16 44 STAT. 568 (1926); 49 U.'S. C. par. 171.
17 Sac. 81 _G 1-2 H. 1. i, 2 (a), 3 Chap. 5, Ant COmmERcE Rac. 1926.
18 Smith v. Aircraft Co., reported in U. S. AVIATION MAGAZINE (Supp. U. S.
Daily, March 22, 1930) at 3. The court discussed the constitutionality of
statutes permitting flight at a fixed minimum altitude. The court justified Federal
legislation as proper under the Interstate Commerce clause, and the State legislation tinder Police Power.
19 Ry. Commission of Wisconsin v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co., 257 U. S. A63,
42 Sup. Ct. 232 (1922); State of New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591,
42 Sup. Ct. 239 (1922).
1 Bank of Pulaski v. Bloomfield State Bank, 226 N. W. 119. (Iowa 1929).
2 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762).
3 Smith v. Mercer. 6 Taunt. 76 (1815); Cocks v. Masterman 9 B. & C.
902 (1829); U. S. v. Chase National Bank, 252 U. S. 485 (1920); U. S. v. The
National Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 270 U. S. 527 (1926); Hoffman v. Milwaukee Bank, 12 Wall. 181 (U. S. 1871); Young v. Lehman, 63 Ala. 519, 523
(1880) ; Redington v. Woods 45 Cal. 406 (1873) ; First National Bank v. Ricker,
71 Ill. 439 (1874); First Nitional Bank v. Marshalltown State Bank,' 107 Pa.
327 (1899); Commercial, etc., Bank v. First National Bank, 30 Md. 11 (1868);
National Bank v. Bangs, 106 Mass. 441 (1871); Bernheirner v. Marshall, 2 Minn.
78 (1858); Pennington County Bank v. First State Bank, 110 Minn. 263 (1910);
Stout v. Benoist, 39,Mo. 227 (1866); Weisser v. Denison, 10 N. Y. 68 (1854);
Brown v. Rosenstein, 208 App. Div. 799 (N. Y. 1924); Ryan v. Bank. 12 Ont.
R. 39 (1886); National Fire Insurance Company v. Mellon National Bank, 276
Pa. 212 (1923) ; Farmers, etc., Bank v. Bank of Rutherford, 115 Tenn. 64 (1905) ;
State v. Brodway National Bank, 282 S. W. 194, (Tenn. 1926); Bank of St.
Albans v. Farmers' Bank, 10 Vt. 141 (1838); Johnston v. Comm. Bank, 27 W.
Va. 343 (1885); Fidelity & Casualty Company of N. Y. v. Planenscheck, 227
N. V. 387 (Wis. 1929).
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4
the rule, either by express rule of statute or by judicial interpretation.
While the doctrine is sustained by the weight of judicial authority,
unfortunately there is not a similar unanimity as to the reason of
the rule.
In Price v. Neal there were two b.lls with different histories, yet both
are governed by the same rules of law. W, a wrongdoer, forged the
name of the drawer, D, and delivered to the payee, P, (probably a
confederate); the bill was indorsed to the defendant, H, for a valuable
consideration, and H subsequently submitted it to the drawee, E, and
received payment. W forged the name of D to a second bill and delivered it to P; P procured the acceptance of E and delivered to H.
A third case, inVolving an extension of the doctrine of Price v. Neal,
is conceivable. Suppose W forges the name of D to a bill; P negotiates the bill to H, and H then gets the acceptance of E. E refuses to
pay. having learned of the forgery. H sues E on the acceptance.
The rule seems to be well settled "that money paid by the drawee
of a negotiable instrument to the holder, under a mistake as to the
genuineness of the body of the instrument, or of the signature of an
indorser,,is recoverable." - This right'is sometime6 based upon an implied warranty of the genuineness of the paper.0 Even "assuming that
there is such an implied warranty by the indorser in the case, of a sale
of the paper," 7 When H presents the bill to E and receives payment
the transaction can hardly be regarded as a sale; it is a discharge of
the instrument. Professor Woodward says that it seems more accurate
8
to say that the right to recover is quasi contractual.

Several theories have been advanced upon which to support the
exceptional rule in Price v. Neal. The first is that the drawee is negligent in not ascertaining the genuineness of the drawer's signature. There
are. as Professor Ames has pointed out, two objections to this theory.
A proper application of the doctrine would require that the drawee
be allowed to show, in a given case, that he was not neglient; e. g.
the skillfulness of the forgery. But it seems that such evidence would,
be excluded. " In the second place, negligence on the part of the payor
4 First National Bank v. Bank ofWyndmere, 15 N. Dak. 229 (1906) (Bill
made since adoption of the N. I. L. in North Dakota, but no reference made
to the statute); American Express Company v. State National Bank, 27 Okla.
824 (1911).
5

'

WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTF,
WOODWARD, op. cit. supra note 5.

§ 80.

7 WOODWARD, op. cit. supra note 5.
8 WOODWARD, op. cit. supra note 5.
9 Ames. The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 4 HAR. L. REv. 297, 298; WOODWARD,

op. cit. supra note 5, § 83.
"If the bank pays money on a forged check, no matter what the circumstances
of caution, or however honest the belief in its genuineness, if the depositor himself
be free from blame and has done nothing to mislead the bank, all the loss must
be borne by the bank, for it acts as its peril." Per Alvey, J., Hardy v, Chesapeake Bank, 51 Md. 562, 505.
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is generally held not to be a bar to the'recovery of money paid under
a mistake.1 0
A second reason for denying a recovery is that in consequence of
of the drawee's paying the bill, the holder loses the right of recourse
against prior indorsers which the dishonor of the bill would have
given him. This theory might be called a loss of secondary rights on
the part of the defendant, constituting a change of position. If this
were true, it would follow that if there were no prior indorsers the
holder would have to restore; but such is not the law. Recovery has
been allowed in cases where there were no prior indorsers, as where
XV negotiates the instrument to P;11 no one is secondarily liable in
such a case, for W did not so undertake, and D is not bound for his
name is forged. There is no change of position and no loss of secondary rights in this instance. Suppose that we do have a prior indorser
and that the law would permit E to rescind payment made to H and
recover it; should H be allowed to rescind the discharge of I? The
answer should be an affirmative one for otherwise H would be in a
very difficult position whichever way he might act. If refused payment,
he would be in danger. If the bill is valid, then I would be discharged
by a proper tender. If H is entitled to rescind the discharge of I, how
soon should he do so? By the better view, within the time he should
have given notice if payment has not been received. Suppose H notifies
I after this time; clearly he has lost the right of recourse as against
I. Even so,"does loss constitute a change of position which would be
a sufficient basis for denying quasi contractual relief against H? A
change of position will defeat the power of rescission in quasi contractual relief. There is essential error as between H and I; and there is
a contract of sale as between H and I. So H is not limited to quasi
contractual recovery against I. There may be rescission by H against
I for essential error; and H has a remedy against I on the warranty
of the genuineness of the instrument, giving him equally effective remedies. Therefore there is no difficulty involved if H does not secure a
quasi contractualright against I.
"The true principle," Professor Ames contended, "upon which
cases like Price v. Neal are to be supported, is the far-reaching principle of natural justice, that as between persons having equal equities,
one of whom must suffer, the legal title shall prevail. The holder of the
bill of exchange paid away his money when he bought it; the drawee
parted with his money when he took up the bill. Each paid in the
belief that the bill was genuine. In point of natural justice 'they are
equally meritorious. But the holder has the legal title to the money." 12
But the equities are not in the same res. The equity of H is in the
purchase price paid for the instrument, while the equity of E is in
10 Ames, op. cit. supra note 9; WOODWARD, op. cit. supra note 5, § 15.

11 Bergstrom v. Ritz-Carlton Restaurant and Hotel Company, 171 App.
Div. 776 (N. Y., 1916);WoODwARD, op. cit. supra note 5z § 85, and cases there
cited.
12 The Doctrine of Price v. Neal. 4 HAR. L. R v. 207. 299.
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the sum paid to H-the latter being an entirely separable transaction. It is contended that what Professor Ames had in mind was,
that as between parties equally meritorious, a legal title will not be
disturbed.'5 Professor Woodward submits that this explanation does
not meet the objection. He takes the view that since H's mistake
precedes E's and cannot be said to result from any act or omission
of E's, it is H's own calamity, for which E is in no way responsible, and affords no reason for denying to E the right to recover
money irrevocably paid by him, in a subsequent transaction, to H. 14 A
second objection to the equal equities theory is that if it is applied
to cases of forgery of the drawer's signature, it should be applied to
cases of forged indorsements. Professor Ames distinguished the latter
class of cases upon the doctrine of subrogation. 15 While Professor
Woodward objects that this theory involves a straining of the doctrine
of subrogation, since E is permitted to sue in his own name, and
without showing payment to the true owner of the bill, yet he conceded
an analogy. 16
Professor Cambell advances a theory of commercial interests. The
theory that the rule is one of policy-a commercial interest that H,
a bona Mide holder for value, shall retain the money he receives in
payment of the instrument-is a most plausible one. That policy
must be based on the theory that H will be induced thereby to buy
the instrument. H may act or refuse to act as it pleases him to do
so. Commercial interests require that he be encouraged to buy the
instrument. He is assured of two remedies: (1) A remedy over
against P or I, the seller, on the theory of mistake or breach of warranty; (2) If he does get the money he may retain it free from any
Is Note in 16 HAR. L. REv. 514.
WOODWARD, op. cit. supra note 5, § 84.
15 "Upon whom finally should the lois fall, wlen a party to a bill or note
pays it to the holder, who could maintain no action against the payor, because
one of the indorsements in his chain of title is a forgery? Here, too, it may
be urged, the equities are equal, and the holder, having obtained the money,
should keep it. But this case differs in an important particular from all the
cases hitherto considered, and another principle comes into play, which overrides
the rule as to equal equities. In all the other cases the bill or note, belongs, not
to the holder, but to him whose name was forged as indorser. The holder, who
bought the bill, was therefore guilty of conversion, however honestly he may
have acted. When he collected the bill, inasmuch as he obtained the money by
means of the true owner's property, he became a constructive trustee of the
money for the benefit of the latter. The true owner may therefore recover the
money as money had and received to his use. If he recovers in his action, the
property in the bill would pass to the holder; but the bill would be of no value
to, him, for, if he should seek to collect it, he would be met with the defense
that it had been paid to him once already. If, on the other hand, the true owner
prefers to proceed on the bill against the maker or acceptor, he may do so, and
the prior payment to the holder, being made to one without title, will be no bar
to the action. The maker or acceptor, however, who pays the true owner,
is entitled' to the bill, and should be subrogated to the owner's right to enforce
the constructive trust against the holder, and could thereby make himself whole.
Consequently, whatever course the true owner may elect to pursue, the loss
must ultimately fall on the holder?' 4 HAR. L. REv. 307.
16 WoonwARD, op. cit. supra note 14.
14

